The Way of the Church
Part 1:
Controlling the Past -VI
by
Hugh Nibley, Ph.D.
Improvement Era 58 (June 1955), 384-6, 455-6
If language followed
natural laws, then the area of intuition might be reduced to nothing and a
machine for perfect translation be devised. But one of the greatest charms of
language is that it may be used waywardly, wantonly, whimsically, ironically,
subtlely, inanely, or literally to any degree which a writer chooses—and
it is the greatest masters of language that take the most liberties with it.
The very purpose of literature is to annihilate boredom, and for most people
the rules of grammar are a bore. The rigid rules of grammar infallibly suggest
naughty tricks to the creative mind, which loves to crack the mold of usage
upon which the whole regularity of language depends. And once the genius has
struck off in a new direction the million promptly and gladly follow him, and
in their dogmatic, unimaginative way turn the new grammatical felony into a law
of grammar.[1]
Thus in an endless
antiphonal the spirit rebukes the letter, and the letter checks the spirit, and
by the time the machine has caught up with the mind, the mind is already two
jumps ahead of it.
This endless game
effectively disqualifies another device by which students have hoped to
circumvent the language obstacle. This is the study of linguistics. The
arbitrariness of language makes all the general laws subject to change without
notice. In linguistics one is everlastingly discovering and demonstrating the
two principles, (1) that people are very conservative, and (2) that in spite of
that, rules do get broken. If the
human race were absolutely conservative, we could have reliable rules of
language.[2]
But fortunately the
very men and women who take the most liberties with language are those who have
the most influence upon it: The people who make the rules are the people who
break them.
A belated attempt to
remove the language barrier is the invention of simplified languages, such as
basic English, and of new international idioms such as Esperanto, Volapuk, and
Interlingua. These languages prove what we should have known long ago: that the
languages men speak today are much harder than they ever need to be, that
people like it that way, and that they find language devoid of challenge to be
tasteless to the point of nausea. After all, language, as its name tells us, is
something that is on the tongue—it must have flavor, and a body, or we
spit it out. This was even truer in ancient times: "What the evidence suggests,"
writes Lord Raglan, "is that the originators, not of language but of all
known languages, were people of acute and fertile minds who took a pride and a
pleasure in working out complex grammatical systems, systems which merely as a
means of communication are quite unnecessary."[3]
We may find such
artificiality regrettable, but let us not forget that all language is
artificial—there is no rule in speech, any more than there is in music;
genius must work with instruments that nature alone has created.
The language of
Homer, Vergil, the Eddas, and the Qasidas is pure professional jargon, about as artificial as a thing can be.
While the evolutionists think of language as a tool, the human race itself
resents functionalism in language as it does in dress.
The value of a
language is not to be measured by its efficiency: The greatest languages are
the hardest. The operation of a hard grammatical apparatus requires a certain
minimum of mental effort, even of those who have grown up with the language
(does the fact that English is our mother tongue make the spelling of English
easy for us?); it guarantees a degree of cerebration which easier languages do
not. The mere statement of a thing in some languages is a mental challenge. The
Romans envied the superior difficulty of Greek and did their best to make their
own language like it. Their writings display a conscious mental effort which
they positively enjoyed and which is the chief stimulus of Latin to this
day—one never misses a sense of exercise, of stretching one's mental muscles,
which is disturbingly lacking in some less vertebrate languages. Looking at a
page of Latin one can readily see that almost every word has a familiar root
and that the story might be very simply and easily told in Spanish or French.
Yet superimposed over the whole page, like a complicated template over a map,
is a grammatical pattern so laborious and arbitrary that the best scholars must
spend hours trying to figure out simple sentences. And this tough and annoying
apparatus is entirely unnecessary. It shows us that language does more than
fill a need for elementary communication. It is mankind's other world, a dream
world, the playing field, the parade ground, the shady retreat, the laboratory,
the theater, the forum, the mirror of the cosmos; we must allow it infinite
scope and infinite ambition. Along with that it is also a tool, a means of
communication of man not only with his fellows but also with himself. This
takes us:
Beyond the Gadgets
Today we have
machines that do most of our calculations for us. IBM machine "702"
is now ready to take over all the functions of accounting and book-keeping in a
world which lives by those disciplines.[4]
At a total of
only six percent of present capital outlay, it is estimated, all the big
industry of the United States could be operated almost entirely by mechanical
controls. Three cheers! What a machine can do, that a machine should do. But
what remains for us? Science without gadgets! That we can do some things that
no machine can or conceivably ever could do—therein lies our true dignity
and destiny as human beings. The checking and ushering and bookkeeping, all the
automatic and repetitious things that make up the day's work for most modern
men, have no business being done by living people; some day they may be done as
they should be, by machines, and then men can really get down to business.
Yet for most of us
such a prospect is simply terrifying. The busy-work that rightfully belongs to
the machine is the refuge of the timid mind, and it is to the gadgetry of
scholarship—the pretentious secretarial tasks of compiling, annotating,
copying, checking, abridging, and the rest—that the academic world clings
today with a sort of desperation. Regiments of workers equipped with costly
machinery are busy searching out, digging up, acquisitioning, classifying,
cataloging, preserving, reproducing, disseminating, explaining, displaying, and
even selling the documents of the past—doing every conceivable thing with
the documents but reading them! They are waiting for the reading machine that
will never come. Three hundred and fifty years ago Joseph Scaliger could read
more ancient texts and comprehend what he read more clearly than any scholar in
the world today. Scientists can stand on the shoulders of those who have gone
before, but not humanists. The latest text in astronomy supersedes and
supplants whole shelves of earlier textbooks, but the humanist must start with
his ABCs and read on, page by page, through the very same literature that
Casaubon and Lipsius had to wade through centuries ago. Summaries,
condensations, and translation will help him not at all, for they are only
opinions and bound to be out of date. A rapid skimming of the stuff is out of
the question. What a joyful thing to contemplate—the one boundless task
left to man in the universe![5]
During the past
century repeated attempts have been made to handle the vast and ever-growing
bulk of stuff bequeathed us by the ancients by certain ingenious experiments in
repackaging. Against a roar of
protest Lord Acton introduced the study of history at Cambridge, but this did
not reduce but only added to the amount of materials to be handled by the
conscientious student. Today ambitious men would grasp the whole message of the
human record by repackaging it in this or that social science: the packages are
impressively tied and labeled—but there is very little in them, and
nothing of the original source material that makes up the vast preponderance of
the field notes and lab notes of the human race. A new school of archaeology is
trying to grasp the same prize, claiming that they can discover the past simply
by looking at pictures—which is much easier than reading texts. Leading
archaeologists are loudly deploring this tendency, which is bound to become as
popular as it is futile. While any text may be meaningful without pictures
(though illustrations are always welcome), no picture can convey its real
meaning without reference to some text: to abolish the text is to abolish
archaeology, and to abolish the original language is to abolish the text. The
glamorous package, a great aid to salesmanship, has no place in scholarship: it
will do nothing either to surmount or circumvent the language barrier.
But you can't expect
people to learn scores of languages to be able to survey the past! They don't
need to. It is one of the delightful compensations to the student willing to go
the hard way that Providence, as if taking pity on his plight and concerned
lest the staggering accumulations of the past go neglected in an inextricable
maze of hundreds of forgotten languages, had removed the difficulty by a most
marvelous device: the world language.
One wishing to study
twentieth century world civilization could do so knowing one language
alone—English—and he would pretty well have to know that. But
English still has serious competitors as a world language, and it has only been
on top for forty years. Imagine, then, how important our language would be if
it had been the only world
language, without competitors, for a thousand years! What if for ten centuries everything of any
importance that was thought or said in the western world had to be said and
written down in English. Well, for a thousand years Latin actually was the one
language of the West, while at the same time Arabic ruled the East. And before
that for another thousand years—the most creative period of
all—Greek was the common world language of East and West. And before that for yet another thousand
years, a common Semitic idiom was the learned and diplomatic language of the
world. The greatest and most significant works of the human mind, as well as
the smallest and most insignificant efforts of the schoolmen, are almost all
recorded in a few languages, and the records of the past run not into
innumerable linguistic puddles to be searched out and correlated but are
conveniently channeled into a few vast, all-inclusive reservoirs. This should
make it clear why a knowledge of certain languages is absolutely indispensable
to any serious study of the past, and why their neglect has led to a serious
crippling of all our efforts to get a convincing picture of what men have
really been doing and thinking through the ages. The gadgets will never answer
that question for us.
But if scholarship is
not a slide-rule science, it has certain controls which any science might envy.
Antiquity is a romantic study; it has an irresistible appeal to the glamor
hunter and the poseur; everybody wants to get into the act. The result is a
chaos of clashing ambitions and waspish tempers, with amateurs and
"professionals" everlastingly accusing each other of stupidity and
humbug. Without a governor the humanities get completely and quickly out of
hand. But in language we have perfect control: The man who can read off the
ancient text you place before him is not likely to be an irresponsible
crackpot. The rigid check on the scholar does not lie in the judgment of his
fellows—scholars band easily together into groups and schools and conform
their thinking to that of prevailing movements with notorious servility—the
perfect teacher of virtue is the text itself. The scholar with an ancient text
before him may do with it as he chooses: He may insert any vowels he pleases if
it is in a Semitic language; he may divide up consonants into whatever groups
catch his fancy; he may punctuate to taste; he may give any word,
allegorically, any meaning he wants to; in short, he can cheat to his heart's
content. But how far will it get him? Every wrong and wilful reading must be
supported by another one: If one word is arbitrarily treated, the next must be
beaten into conformity with it, and the resulting sentence, all wrong, must
match the next sentence, and so on. With every wrong reading the student gets
himself deeper into the mud; the farther he carries the game the more
humiliating it becomes; with every new syllable his position becomes more
intolerable and the future more threatening. In the end he gives up and starts
all over again—the text, unaided and alone, has won the day.
The more one
considers the power of the written word, the more miraculous it appears. The
determined and desperate efforts to control it which we have been describing
are a remarkable tribute to its uncanny capacity to convey the truth regardless
of designing men. Within the last decade a few simple scrolls have successfully
overcome the solid and determined opposition of scholarly consensus and
shattered all the fondest beliefs and firmest preconceptions of church
historians. Church history must now be written all over again and it is to the
most vital questions of that fascinating subject that we must now turn our
attention.
In times of world
crisis and widespread calamity, those churchmen who normally exhibit a bland
and easy confidence in the assured and inevitable triumph of Christianity through
the ages find themselves pressed by the force of events to ask questions and
indulge in reflections which in better times are left strictly alone. We have
suggested already that the key to conventional church history is its
fair-weather determination not to face up to certain unpleasant, nay, alarming
possibilities, in particular the proposition that the church of Christ did not
survive in the world long after the Apostles.
But today, as at
other moments of great upheaval, such authorities, Catholic and Protestant, as
D. Busy, Bardy, A. G. Herbert, and F. A. M. Spencer are moved to remind us
that, after all, Christianity has never come anywhere near either converting or
saving the world. Instead of the moral reform which the fourth-century fathers
promised with such confidence, if the empire would only turn officially
Christian, came a disastrous deterioration of morals; instead of world peace
(also promised), world war; instead of prosperity, economic collapse; instead
of the promised intellectual certainty, violent controversy; instead of faith,
speculation and doubt; instead of tolerance and love, ceaseless polemic and
persecution; instead of trust in God, cynicism and power politics. The world
once Christianized not only remained barbarian, but became also more and more
barbaric as it passed from one century of Christian tutelage to the next.
Contemporary scholars freely admit, since they can't deny it, that something
went very wrong. A. G. Herbert, a Catholic writer, now even goes so far as to
declare that defeat, not victory, is "the hall-mark of authenticity"
for the church of Christ on earth.
So much being
conceded, the only question is not whether God would allow his church to
suffer—he has allowed
it—but how far he would allow things to go? Some Christians when pressed
will allow that the rule of evil reached the point of almost complete extermination for the church on earth; this
is the Baptist "trial of blood" theory—that the church has been
reduced from time to time to an almost imperceptible trickle but never allowed
to go out entirely. The last inch, of course, they cannot concede, for that
would be fatal to all their claims. To save at least the tattered remnants of
the true church, modern claimants fall back on three main arguments. The first
is the perfectly irrelevant "gates of hell" passage (Matt. 16:18),
which we shall discuss later. The second is what they like to call "the
simple fact" that the church has, for all its setbacks and troubles,
persisted in the world unintermittently for nigh onto two thousand years. This
is worth a moment's thought.
Actually that
statement of survival merely assumes what it claims to prove, namely that
whatever has come through so many centuries must be the true church. But the fact that churches (never just one, and usually many) calling themselves
Christ's have been found on the earth in every century since the apostles is no
proof in itself that all or any of those churches really were Christ's. After
all, did not the Lord himself predict a time when there would be many groups
bearing his name and saying, "Lo, here is Christ, or there!" and did
not he warn that at such a time none of those professing Christians would be authorized? (Matt. 24:23.) As
the so-called Apostolic Fathers and the early apologists never tire of
repeating, the name of Christian
does not guarantee the Lord's
approval of recognition of the individual or society bearing it, nor does its
presence in the earth prove at any time that Christ's church has survived. So
though we find in every age churches claiming to be the true heirs of the
apostles, and though we are under obligation to investigate them all, we are by
no means bound to accept any one of them simply because it is big or
old—least of all, simply because it exists. Athanasius says the argument
of bigness is preposterous; Justin Martyr says the argument of antiquity is
vicious. The argument of mere existence is the weakest of all, when at no time
since Christ have there failed to be numbers of Christian churches all damning
each other as impostors.
The third argument, usually
delivered in shocked and outraged tones, is that God simply would not allow a
complete dissolution of his church. "Can God fail?" cried an angry
priest to the writer, with a great show of indignation. Well, God has
"failed" to give the earth two moons or equip the human race with
gold teeth—but is that failure? One can speak only of failure where an intended aim is not achieved;
where desirable things are dispensed with, that is not failure but policy.
"How often" would God have done things for the people—"and
ye would not!" (Matt 23:37.) To learn what God's intention and policy are
in the matter, we must consult not our own common sense or emotions but the
statements of his prophets: "My ways are not your ways!" The ancient
pagans loved to charge the Christians with believing in a God who was either
immoral because he knowingly allowed the existence of evil or weak because he
could not prevent it. Their logical minds could not conceive how anything could
happen in a universe ruled by an omnipotent God which was not the immediate and
consummate expression of that God's desire and intention. Those Christians are
guilty of the same vanity and impetuosity who insist that because they just
can't see the point in taking the church from the earth, God would be foolish
and unjust—a failure—if he permitted it. The solution of the
problem lies not in men's feelings on a subject on which they are necessarily
very ill-informed, but in God's expressed intention in the matter. Fortunately
the New Testament contains full and explicit information.
[1] This process is illustrated by Simeon
Potter, Our Language
(London: Penguin, 1953), ch. 4, 7, and passim, with Shakespeare leading the parade of
innovators.
[2] "Now, comparative philological research has
definitely proved that the laws which govern one language or group of languages
do not necessarily govern another, nor do the laws which control linguistic
phenomena in one period of history hold true of the same phenomena in a
different age." William Foxwell Albright, "Philological Method in
Identification of Anatolian Place-Names," Journal of Egyptian
Archaeology 11 (1925): 19.
[3] Lord Fitz Roy Raglan, The Origins of
Religion (London:
Watts, 1949), 43.
[4] Science News Letter 65 (June 5, 1954): 360.
[5] On the closing of the other doors,
Phillippe Le Corbeiller, "Crystals and the Future of Physics," Scientific
American 188 (January
1953), 50-56. On the new "translation machine" (IBM 701) and its
limitations, see Mina Rees, "Computers: 1954," Scientific Monthly 79 (August 1954): 118-24. This gadget
is simply an electronic dictionary that gives back the one-to-one equivalents
that have been built into it. Where such one-to-one relationships do not exist
between languages, it will not work.